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Abstract  R&D  cooperation  has  become  a  core  aspect  of  the  innovation  strategy  of  R&D-
performing  organisations  over  the  last  three  decades.  Globalization  has  increased  the
imperative  to  organise  these  cross-border,  inter-ﬁrm  agreements  efﬁciently,  and  this  has  led
to a  cross-fertilisation  of  ideas  from  a  variety  of  ﬁelds,  including  international  business,  man-
agement, geography  and,  more  recently,  psychology.  The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  review  and
synthesise this  literature  to  identify  new  directions  for  research.  The  breadth  of  the  academic
discussion  has  evolved  towards  a  general  consensus  on  governance  choice  decisions,  motives
for collaboration,  partner  selection  decisions  and  performance  implications.  Despite  having
achieved  some  degree  of  clarity  on  these  issues,  the  growing  complexity  and  international
nature of  these  alliances  requires  a  multidisciplinary  approach,  both  in  relation  to  the  theoriespartnering;
Literature  review;
Research  agenda
to apply,  as  well  as  in  the  type  of  data  needed.
© 2018  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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aIntroduction
Greater  cross-border  competition  means  that  nowadays
there  is  no  ﬁrm  capable  of  staying  competitive  by  rely-
ing  on  entirely  on  its  internal  resources  and  capabilities
(Contractor  et  al.,  2010;  Das  and  Teng,  2000;  Suarez  and
García-Canal,  2003).  While  this  need  of  accessing  external
resources  is  common  to  ﬁrms  in  all  sectors,  the  need  to
collaborate  with  external  agents----i.e.  suppliers,  customers,∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: noya@uniovi.es (A. Martínez-Noya).
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.04.001
2340-9436/© 2018 ACEDE. Published by Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U. This is
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ompetitors,  universities  or  institutions----is even  more  evi-
ent  in  technological  sectors  (Kedia  and  Mooty,  2013;
uintana  García  and  Benavides  Velasco,  2007).  More  must
e  done  with  limited  R&D  budgets,  as  products  and  services
re  increasingly  multi-technology,  and  this  growing  breadth
f  competences  raises  the  costs  and  the  associated  risks
Leiponen  and  Helfat,  2010).  Firms  are  forced  to  innovate
t  a faster  rate  so  as  to  maintain  their  competitiveness  in
he  market  and,  as  a  result,  they  see  technological  or  R&D
lliances  not  as  an  option,  but  as  a  strategic  need  (Cassiman
nd  Veugelers,  2006).  Previous  literature  has  shown  that
ccessing  external  technological  knowledge  through  R&D
lliances  may  help  ﬁrms  to  reduce  time-to-market,  develop
nnovations  that  otherwise  could  not  be  done  internally,
 an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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mprove  the  quality  and  efﬁciency  of  the  innovations  devel-
ped,  as  well  as  facilitate  the  access  to  new  markets
Narula,  2001).  This  reﬂects  a  broader  phenomenon,  as
ooperation  at  all  aspects  of  the  value  chain  is  an  essen-
ial  part  of  economic  activity,  as  seen  by  the  growth  in  global
alue  chains  (Hernández  and  Pedersen,  2017) and  innovation
etworks.  In  addition,  universities,  research  institutes  (not
o  mention  governments,  and  supra-national  organisations)
ll  seek  to  create  greater  efﬁciencies.  R&D  cooperation  is
 complex  activity,  as  given  its  strategic  role  and  usually
acit  and  ﬁrm-speciﬁc  nature,  is  an  activity  that,  if  poorly
lanned  and  managed,  has  long-term  consequences  that  can
hreaten  ﬁrm’s  survival.
Despite  the  beneﬁts,  R&D  alliances  are  risky  (Monteiro
t  al.,  2017).  They  require  partners  to  transfer  and  commu-
icate  technological  knowledge  that  is  usually  difﬁcult  to
odify  and  protect,  thus  generating  important  hazards  for
he  partners  (Cantwell  and  Santangelo,  1999;  Oxley,  1997).
his  means  that  ﬁrms  have  to  try  to  maximise  coordination
nd  communication  so  as  to  fully  beneﬁt  from  the  partner’s
xternal  knowledge,  while  at  the  same  time  protecting  their
nowledge  from  undesired  technological  leakages  (Grimpe
nd  Kaiser,  2010;  Martínez-Noya  et  al.,  2013).  In  other
ords,  ﬁrms  face  an  inter-organisational  learning  dilemma
Larsson  et  al.,  1998).  This  tension  between  knowledge  shar-
ng  and  knowledge  protection  may  lead  to  other  paradoxes
hen  selecting  alliance  partners,  such  as  a  higher  prefer-
nce  for  familiar  and  nearby  partners  especially  for  more
adical  projects  (Li  et  al.,  2008)  which  may  bias  partner
election  decisions  and  lead  to  the  paradox  of  embedded-
ess  (Uzzi,  1996,  1997).
For  this  reason,  the  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  review  the
iterature  on  R&D  alliances  to  summarise  what  we  know
nd  identify  the  main  challenges  for  future  research.  We
elieve  that,  despite  the  vast  literature  analysing  R&D
ooperation,  there  are  many  dimensions  of  R&D  alliances
hat  require  a  better  understanding.  Given  their  strate-
ic  nature,  R&D  alliances  provide  important  insights  into
ther  types  of  alliances  as  they  require  greater  diligence
nd  planning.  Therefore,  the  literature  on  R&D  alliances  has
onsistently  foreshadowed  (and  even  predicted)  our  under-
tanding  of  cooperation  in  other  value-adding  activities.  In
eneral,  although  analysed  from  different  disciplines----such
s management,  international  business,  and  innovation----,
he  themes  of  this  research  have  been  consistent  around  the
ame  questions,  although  the  degree  of  analysis  and  preci-
ion  has  become  increasingly  more  sophisticated.  Given  the
ultidisciplinary  nature  of  the  research  on  R&D  alliances,
his  paper  tries  to  identify  future  research  opportunities
rom  the  current  streams  of  enquiry  in  R&D  alliances  that
an  still  be  framed  within  these  questions:
 Why  do  ﬁrms  engage  in  R&D  alliances?  What  are  the  moti-
vations  for  undertaking  these  partnerships?
 What  kinds  of  activities  are  undertaken?  How  and  why  has
the  scope  of  activities  within  R&D  alliances  changed? With  whom  and  where  do  ﬁrms  partner?  How  do  ﬁrms
select  partners?  Does  location  matter?
 How  do  ﬁrms  undertake  alliances?  How  does  contract
design  inﬂuence  alliance  development  and  performance?
a
c
I
lA.  Martínez-Noya,  R.  Narula
 How  do  R&D  alliances  impact  innovation  and/or  ﬁnancial
performance?  What  factors  moderate  this  alliance-
performance  relationship?
Our  impression  from  our  literature  review  is  that  the
ost  interesting  research  opportunities  emerge  from  the
nterlinkages  between  these  questions,  and  require  us
o  take  a multidisciplinary  approach  that  encompasses
oth  the  management  and  international  business  (IB)  lit-
ratures.  These  questions  are  obviously  hard  to  clearly
elineate  because  in  designing  an  alliance,  they  are  inter-
ependent.  For  instance,  it  is  important  to  get  a  better
nderstanding  on  how  different  motivations  to  form  these
echnological  agreements,  and  how  discrete  governance
echanisms  (such  as  equity  versus  non-equity  modes),  or
artner  selection,  may  affect  alliance  outcomes  (Diestre
nd  Rajagopalan,  2012).  Alliances  also  involve  location
ecisions,  which  shape  governance  and  partner  selection
ecisions  as  well  (Narula  and  Santangelo,  2012).  Therefore,
ecause  ﬁrms  increasingly  utilise  a  global  R&D  portfolio
as  also  illustrated  by  the  growing  interest  in  open  inno-
ation),  understanding  how  to  ‘‘orquestrate’’  the  effective
overnance  of  these  agreements  is  crucial  (Bogers  et  al.,
017).  Conceptually,  they  require  a  wide-ranging  set  of  con-
epts  from  sociology,  game  theory,  industrial  organisation,
conomic  geography  and  international  business,  to  name  a
ew.  More  recently  attention  has  been  drawn  to  contract
esign  (Contractor  and  Reuer,  2014)  or  behavioural  theories
s  a means  to  analyse  how  more  microfoundational  aspects
nﬂuence  R&D  alliance  decisions  (Das  and  Kumar,  2011;
artínez-Noya  and  García-Canal,  2015).  We  believe  that  this
ill  allow  a  better  understanding  of  how  managers’  percep-
ions  or  cognitive  frameworks  shape  their  alliance  decisions
n  terms  of  their  formation  and  development  (Weber  and
ayer,  2011).
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  First,  we
xplain  what  we  understand  by  R&D  alliances  and  review
heir  different  typologies.  Secondly,  we  focus  on  reviewing
he  literature  according  to  the  different  key  ﬁve  questions
hat  have  been  addressed  on  this  theme  (why,  what,  with
hom,  how  and  performance  effects),  to  identify  future
esearch  opportunities.  Finally,  we  present  the  main  conclu-
ions  that  can  be  drawn  from  the  study  and  highlight  the
ain  research  opportunities  that  we  identiﬁed.
he nature and typologies of R&D alliances
t  is  important  to  begin  with  a  deﬁnition  of  what  we  under-
tand  to  be  R&D  alliances.  For  our  purposes,  R&D  alliances
re  innovation-based  relationships  formed  by  two  or  more
artners  who  pool  their  resources  and  coordinate  their  activ-
ties  to  reach  a common  goal.  These  are  relationships  in
hich  R&D  activities  constitute  a  signiﬁcant  part  of  the
ollaborative  effort,  and  represent  a  particular  subset  of
ooperative  agreements  (Hagedoorn,  2002;  Oxley,  1997).
hey  are  also  referred  to  as  cooperative  R&D,  technological
lliances,  strategic  technology  partnering,  or  technological
ooperative  agreements  (Narula  and  Martinez-Noya,  2015).
ndeed,  the  lack  of  uniformity  in  their  deﬁnition  across  the
iterature  reﬂects  the  multidisciplinarity  of  the  subject.
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WWhat  more  can  we  learn  from  R&D  alliances?  
R&D  alliances  present  many  managerial  challenges  in
their  effective  design  and  management.  This  is  so  because
R&D  alliances  tend  to  require  the  exchange  of  tacit  and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc  knowledge----knowledge  that  includes  hard-to-
communicate  skills  or  know-how----that is  difﬁcult  to  codify
and  is  better  transferred  through  close  interaction  (Cantwell
and  Santangelo,  1999).  When  partners  cannot  clearly  deﬁne
property  rights  over  knowledge,  it  becomes  difﬁcult  for
them  to  establish  knowledge  transfer  barriers  (Narula,
2001).  In  other  words,  the  intensity  of  communication
required  among  partners,  generates  important  appropri-
ability  hazards  (Kogut,  1988;  Oxley,  1997).  Appropriability
hazards  imply  the  risk  of  inadequate  uses  or  modiﬁcations
of  the  knowledge  transferred  that  may  leave  the  trans-
feror  worse  off.  Such  a  risk  occurs  either  when:  (1)  the
recipient  partner  takes  advantage  of  that  acquired  knowl-
edge  to  become  a  future  competitor  (Alcácer  and  Oxley,
2014);  or  (2)  the  knowledge  gained  by  the  recipient  part-
ner  may  beneﬁt  competitors  with  whom  they  may  also  be
engaged  with  (Martínez-Noya  and  García-Canal,  2015).  Part-
ners  face  a  critical  dilemma:  how  do  they  maintain  the
necessary  degree  of  collaboration  and  knowledge  exchange
to  achieve  the  alliance  objectives,  while  avoiding  the  unin-
tended  leakage  of  valuable  technology  (Grimpe  and  Kaiser,
2010;  Mudambi  and  Tallman,  2010;  Oxley  and  Sampson,
2004;  Zhang  and  Baden-Fuller,  2010)?  As  we  explain  in  the
following  sections,  ﬁrms  try  to  protect  their  knowledge
through  the  design  of  complex  and  lengthy  contracts,  or  by
choosing  familiar  and  trusted  partners,  which  may  diminish
innovation  performance.
These  collaborative  agreements  for  innovation  can  be
horizontal  (e.g.  among  rivals),  vertical  (e.g.  with  suppliers
or  clients)  or  institutional  (with  universities  and  research
institutes)  (Belderbos  et  al.,  2004).  Horizontal  alliances
are  those  formed  among  ﬁrms  engaged  in  more  or  less
the  same  kinds  and  types  of  value  adding  activities.  They
provide  opportunities  for  economies  of  scale  and  scope,
but  are  also  prone  to  conﬂict  and  leakage  of  intellectual
property.  Vertical  R&D  collaborations  are  those  between
ﬁrms  operating  in  related  industries  along  the  same  value
chain.  They  are  especially  important  within  global  produc-
tion  networks  and  global  value  chains,  and  are  especially
common  for  development  (as  opposed  to  research).  Over-
all,  compared  to  vertical  agreements,  horizontal  alliances
tend  to  reﬂect  a  more  complex  strategic  intent,  and  require
closer  collaboration  (Narula  and  Hagedoorn,  1999;  Narula,
2001).  Besides  this  categorisation,  previous  research  clas-
siﬁes  R&D  alliances  into  two  groups:  equity-based  (joint
ventures)  and  non-equity-based  alliances  (Das  and  Teng,
2000;  Gulati,  1995;  Hagedoorn,  2002).  The  increase  of
non-equity  modes  of  governance  offers  higher  ﬂexibility
compared  to  equity  forms  (Narula  and  Martinez-Noya,  2015;
van  Kranenburg  et  al.,  2014).  Nevertheless,  R&D  alliances
can  take  many  structural  or  organisational  forms.  Fig.  1  lists
the  most  common  types.  In  general,  licensing  agreements
do  not  usually  involve  active  collaboration,  and  knowledge
ﬂows  tend  to  be  one-way.1 Licensing  agreements  are  there-
fore  passive  conduits  for  knowledge  ﬂows,  and  are  not
1 With the exception of maybe some sporadic ﬂows due to legal
clauses that require the licensee to feedback to the licensor for
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ormally  qualiﬁed  as  alliances  by  themselves.  Cross-
icensing,  mutual  second  sourcing  or  two-way  licensing
greements  do  involve  bilateral  technology  ﬂows,  thus
equiring  more  extensive  agreements,  but  in  general
erms  they  imply  a  low  degree  of  collaboration.  Indeed,
hese  governance  modes  are----by  deﬁnition----adopted  where
nowledge  has  been  codiﬁed.  Despite  this,  it  should  be
oted  that  these  agreements  may  be  a precursor  for  more
omplex  and  intense  collaboration,  and  may  also  be  used
ith  more  intense  collaboration,  which  means  that  these
greements  may  also  have  a  strategic  intent.  Contractor
nd  Reuer  (2014)  relate  a  typology  of  different  R&D  alliance
ypes  with  the  need  of  developing  complex  and  lengthy  con-
racts  (see  Fig.  2).  Overall,  the  general  argument  is  that
ncreasing  commitment,  investment,  and  interdependence
mong  partners  is  correlated  with  more  complex  and  lengthy
ontracts  due  to  greater  knowledge  concerns.
Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  rank  order-
ng  in  Figs.  1  and  2  is  only  illustrative  because,  as  argued  by
ontractor  et  al.  (2011:  68): ‘‘.  .  . structure  is  not  an  end  in
tself.  When  it  comes  to  creating  and  appropriating  value  or
ew  technology  in  an  alliance,  learning  from  one’s  partner,
mproving  the  efﬁciency  with  which  knowledge  is  trans-
erred,  coordinating  with  one’s  ally,  or  moderating  their
pportunism,  it  is  the  process  and  intensity  of  interactions
etween  the  personnel  of  the  two  companies----more  than
he  legal  or  contractual  form----that  matter.’’  Even  the  ‘sim-
lest’  vertical  alliance  to  supply  a  codiﬁed  component  can
nvolve  interactions  between  partners  that  go  beyond  just
oordination  to  include  key  issues  like  the  joint  development
f  future  technologies  or  the  co-design  of  new  products.
lliances  evolve  over  time  so  trustworthiness  among  part-
ers  can  result  in  the  joint  design  and  development  of  core
omponents  for  next  generation  of  technologies  (Dyer  and
hu,  2003),  although  this  may  also  mean  higher  appropri-
bility  concerns.
hy do ﬁrms undertake R&D alliances? From
ost to value-enhancing considerations
lobalisation  of  dynamic  markets  and  the  growing  complex-
ty  and  multidisciplinary  nature  of  the  innovation  processes
eans  that  R&D  cooperation  is  no  longer  seen  as  a  sign
f  weakness.  Indeed,  to  undertake  all  R&D  activities  inter-
ally  within  the  ﬁrm  is  the  exception.  R&D  alliances  offer
any  different  advantages,  such  as  accessing  complemen-
ary  resources  to  develop  new  or  improved  products  or
rocesses,  explore  new  markets,  achieve  lower  costs,  mit-
gate  risks,  or  reduce  time-to-market  (Hagedoorn  et  al.,
000;  Narula,  2001;  Sakakibara,  2002).
Broadly  speaking,  the  growth  of  R&D  alliances  has  either
een  explained  through  the  lens  of  transaction  cost  theory
aking  a  economisation  perspective  (Pisano  and  Teece,  1989;
illiamson,  1975),  or  by  taking  a  more  strategic  perspective,hrough  the  use  of  a  number  of  other  different  theoreti-
al  approaches,  such  as:  the  resource-based  theory  of  the
rm  (Barney,  1991;  Das  and  Teng,  2000;  Wernerfelt,  1984),
echnical help, or for the adaptation of the technology to interna-
ional markets.
198  A.  Martínez-Noya,  R.  Narula
Figure  1  Organisational  modes  of  R&D  alliances  and  extent  of  inter-ﬁrm  collaboration.
Source:  Narula  and  Martinez-Noya  (2015).
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tFigure  2  Complexity  and  length  of  c
ource:  Contractor  and  Reuer  (2014).
nowledge-based  view  and  organisational  learning  (Kogut
nd  Zander,  1993),  social  network  theory  (Gulati,  1995;
owell  and  Grodal,  2005),  or  even  the  dynamic  capabilities
pproach  (Teece  et  al.,  1997;  Zollo  and  Winter,  2002).  In
eneral  terms,  the  key  underlying  difference  between  the
conomisation  perspective  and  the  more  strategic  ones  is  a
undamentally  different  view  of  the  way  ﬁrms  make  their
ecisions.  Transaction  cost  theory  assumes  that  ﬁrms’  make
s
g
t
facts  for  different  R&D  alliance  types.
ersus  buy  decisions  are  driven  by  their  willingness  to  reduce
oth  production  and  transaction  costs  while  protecting  from
pportunism  (Hennart,  1988;  Williamson,  1975).  However,
he  transaction  costs  logic  does  not  capture  many  of  the
trategic  advantages  that  alliances  can  offer,  such  as  market
rowth  or  inter-ﬁrm  learning  through  alliances;  motivations
hat  during  recent  decades  have  become  more  important
or  ﬁrms  to  form  R&D  alliances  (Narula  and  Dunning,  1998).
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This  reﬂects  changes  in  their  sourcing  strategies  as  a variety
of  activities  along  the  value  chain  are  externalised  (Hätonen
and  Eriksson,  2009;  Kotabe  and  Mudambi,  2009),  and  this
3 One of the most used surveys in innovation studies is the Euro-What  more  can  we  learn  from  R&D  alliances?  
More  recent  R&D  alliance  literature  has  tended  to  emphasise
that  alliances  are  not  only  the  result  of  a  cost  minimisation
strategy,  but  also  the  result  of  value-enhancing  consider-
ations,  such  as  market  growth  or  inter-ﬁrm  learning  through
alliances.
In  this  sense,  strategic  management  theories,  such  as
the  resource-based  view,  highlight  the  fact  that  ﬁrms  are
boundedly  rational  and  undertake  decisions  based  on  the
need  to  enhance  their  technological  and  organisational
capabilities  (Das  and  Teng,  2000).  From  this  perspective,
ﬁrms  form  R&D  alliances  to  create  value  by  for  exam-
ple:  acquiring  complementary  resources,  leveraging  existing
resources,  developing  new  (or  improved)  products  and  inno-
vation  capabilities  or  entering  new  markets  (Sakakibara,
2002).  These  strategic  drivers  seemed  especially  relevant
with  the  emergence  of  new  technological  sectors  (such  as
biotechnology)  and  the  growing  technological  convergence
between  industries  (such  as  computers  and  automobiles,
or  new  materials).  The  cross-fertilisation  of  technological
areas  implied  that  to  stay  competitive  ﬁrms  need  to  have
a  broader  range  of  competencies  (Granstrand  et  al.,  1997),
which  encouraged  the  use  of  a  portfolio  of  R&D  alliances
as  a  way  to  quickly  access  complementary  resources  and
capabilities  (Leiblein  and  Miller,  2003;  Mol,  2005;  Nicholls-
Nixon  and  Woo,  2003;  Quinn,  2000).  R&D  alliances  offer  the
possibility  to  learn  from  the  competencies  of  the  partner
because  alliances  are  not  only  a  means  for  taking  advantage
of  external  capabilities,  but  also  a  means  for  the  transfer
of  such  capabilities,  as  ﬁrms  can  internalise  the  know-how
and  skills  that  are  the  basis  of  their  partners’  capabilities
(Hamel,  1991;  Hong  and  Snell,  2013;  Howard  et  al.,  2016).
However,  such  R&D  alliances  can  accentuate  the  interor-
ganisational  learning  dilemma  that  ﬁrms  face  as  they  can
generate  important  managerial  challenges  for  actors  wishing
to  maximise  learning  while  avoiding  opportunism  (Khanna
et  al.,  1998).
Nowadays,  both  transaction  cost  minimising  and  value-
enhancing  reasons  are  regarded  as  complementary  to  each
other,  and  indeed  many  studies  combine  both  approaches
(Lai  and  Chang,  2010)  because  very  few  agreements  are
distinctly  driven  by  one  motivation  or  the  other.2 Table  1
summarises  the  main  incentives  to  form  R&D  alliances  based
on  transaction  costs  and  strategic  management  theoretical
approaches  (Hagedoorn  et  al.,  2000).
In  relation  to  this,  evidence  suggests  that  different  types
of  R&D  partners  offer  different  advantages,  which  means
that  different  alliance  motivations  will  inﬂuence  the  type
of  partner  to  be  chosen  (Belderbos  et  al.,  2004).  However,
the  interlinkages  that  exist  between  the  R&D  alliance  moti-
vations  and  the  type  of  partners  have  been  less  studied
(Miotti  and  Sachwald,  2003)  and  offer  promising  research
opportunities.  For  example,  on  the  one  hand,  it  has  been
long  recognised  the  advantages  that  collaborating  with
customers  can  have  so  as  to  reduce  the  risks  associated
to  the  introduction  of  new  products  by  reducing  demand
uncertainty  (von  Hippel,  2005).  On  the  other  hand,  due
to  the  specialisation  advantages  that  an  external  supplier
may  offer,  as  a  result  of  the  aggregation  of  demands  of
2 See Madhok (1997) or Argyres and Zenger (2012) for an in-depth
analysis of this debate.
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elated  clients,  cost-reduction  is  very  frequently  the  moti-
ation  behind  cooperation  with  suppliers  (Chung  and  Kim,
003).  While,  institutional  cooperation  (with  universities
nd  research  centres)  has  been  found  to  be  useful  for  basic
esearch,  i.e.  when  the  main  objective  of  R&D  cooperation
s  accessing  new  scientiﬁc  knowledge  required  for  break-
hrough  innovations  (Tether,  2002).
Therefore,  it  would  be  very  interesting  to  further  inves-
igate  how  ﬁrms  may  deal  with  motives  or  innovation
bjectives3 that  may  present  conﬂicting  interests  (Leiponen
nd  Helfat,  2010),  or  how  factors  such  as  the  ﬁrm  size,  sec-
or  or  origin  may  inﬂuence  ﬁrms’  motivations  to  form  R&D
lliances  and  the  type  of  partner  to  be  chosen.  Similarly,  we
till  have  only  a limited  understanding  of  the  pattern  of  R&D
lliances  between  ﬁrms  from  developed  countries  and  ﬁrms
n  emerging  ones.  Some  case  studies  have  suggested  that
&D  alliances  with  developed  multinationals  were  instru-
ental  in  the  emergence  of  ﬁrms  like  China’s  Haier  or  India’s
ata  (Duysters  et  al.,  2009).  However,  the  factors  driving
estern  ﬁrms  to  form  R&D  alliances  with  ﬁrms  in  emerging
arkets  have  not  received  too  much  attention  (Jacob  et  al.,
013).  In  this  sense,  given  that  international  R&D  alliances
ay  have  exploitation  or  exploration  orientations,  it  would
e  also  interesting  to  analyse  from  a  dynamic  or  evolution-
ry  perspective,  how  ﬁrms  from  emerging  economies,  such
s  China,  may  have  used  R&D  alliances  with  Western  ﬁrms  as
 useful  mechanism  to  catch-up  with  developed  economies.
Finally,  we  argue  that  the  future  of  this  research  ﬁeld
equires  integrating  insights  from  different  disciplines,
specially  from  psychological  or  behavioural  theories,  to
ore  traditional  managerial  perspectives.  For  example,  a
ood  example  is  the  recent  work  by  Tyler  and  Caner  (2016)
hat  apply  behavioural  theory  and  ﬁnd  that  increases  in  the
istance  of  high  technology  ﬁrms’  new  product  introduc-
ion  performance  below  aspirations  serve  as  a  motivation
or  increases  in  R&D  alliances,  and  slack  intensiﬁes  this
elationship.  Thus,  we  call  for  further  studies  on  how  man-
gers’  expectations  or  aspirations  may  inﬂuence  ﬁrms’  R&D
lliance  formation  decisions.
hat is the scope of R&D alliance activity?
owards increased fragmentation and
omplexity
irms  have  expanded  the  scope  of  their  alliance  activ-
ty,  partnering  with  a variety  of  different  actors  including
ustomers,  suppliers,  universities  and  competitors  (Ashok
t  al.,  2016;  Nieto  and  Santamaría,  2007;  Un  et  al.,  2010).ean CIS survey (Community Innovation Survey) sponsored by the
tatistical agency of the European Union, lists the following inno-
ation objectives: Replace outdated products; Improve product
uality; Expand product assortment; Enter new markets or increase
arket share; Increase ﬂexibility of production; Reduce labour
osts; Reduce use of materials; Reduce use of energy; Fulﬁl govern-
ent regulation or standards requirement; Mitigate environmental
amage.
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Table  1  Main  motivations  to  form  R&D  alliances  based  on  transaction  costs  and  strategic  management  approaches.
Motivation  to  form  a  R&D  alliance
Transaction  costs  perspective Strategic  management  perspectives
•  Minimise  cost  of  transactions  involving  intangible
assets  (technical  knowledge)
• Circumvent  incomplete  contracts
• Avoid  opportunistic  market  behaviour
• Avoid  high  costs  of  internalising  the  activity
•  Share  R&D  costs
• Pool  risks
• Economies  of  scale  and  scope
• Co-opt  competition
•  Improve  competitive  position
• Coordinate  value  chains  with  coalition  partners
• Increase  efﬁciency,  synergy,  power  through  network
• Access  complementary  resources  to  exploit  own
resources
• Use  collaboration  as  learning  vehicle  to  accumulate  and
deploy  new  skills  and  capabilities
• Learn  from  partners,  transfer  technology
• Create  new  investment  options
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ncludes  areas  that  were  traditionally  vertically  integrated,
uch  as  those  related  to  the  innovation  process  (Howells
t  al.,  2008;  Manning  et  al.,  2008;  Santamaría  et  al.,  2010;
uinn,  2000).  Furthermore,  ﬁrms  are  increasingly  external-
sing  these  R&D  activities  using  an  extensive  portfolio  of
nternational  alliances,  not  only  in  developed  countries  but
lso  in  developing  ones  (Doh,  2005;  Jensen,  2009;  Kedia  and
ukherjee,  2009;  Kotabe  and  Mudambi,  2009;  Levy,  2005;
ol  et  al.,  2004,  2005;  Martínez-Noya  and  García-Canal,
010;  Martínez-Noya  et  al.,  2012;  Nieto  and  Rodríguez,  2011;
uintás  et  al.,  2008).  Indeed,  its  increased  internationalisa-
ion  is  now  due  not  only  to  demand  factors  (which  tend  to
e  associated  with  adaptive  R&D  in  response  to  speciﬁc  mar-
et  needs),  but  also  to  supply-side  ones  (Narula  and  Zanfei,
005).  As  a  consequence,  the  R&D  function  is  being  disinte-
rated  into  different  technologically  separable  R&D  services
hat  can  be  performed  in  different  locations  either  by  the
rm  or  by  an  external  partner  (Lewin  and  Peeters,  2006;
ewin  et  al.,  2009;  Manning  et  al.,  2008;  Maskell  et  al.,
007),  and  therefore  ﬁrms  need  to  search  for  the  optimal
overnance  and  geographical  location  of  each  of  the  activi-
ies  or  R&D  services  within  their  value  chain.
One  of  the  limitations  of  many  studies  has  been  that  they
sually  consider  the  R&D  function  as  a  whole  without  distin-
uishing  between  types  of  R&D  services  or  activities  within
he  innovation  process.  However,  the  multidisciplinary  and
omplex  nature  of  the  ﬁrms’  innovation  process  has  induced
rms  to  disintegrate  their  R&D  process  into  several  dif-
erent  and  technologically  separable  R&D  aspects  (Fosfuri
nd  Roca,  2002;  Pavitt,  1999).  In  relation  to  these  deci-
ions  about  how  and  which  activities  to  externalise,  it  is
ften  argued  that  companies  should  keep  core  activities  in-
ouse,  and  externalise  non-core  ones.  However,  as  argued
y  Linares-Navarro  et  al.  (2014)  it  is  still  not  clear  what
‘core’’  activities  are  and  how  they  can  be  differentiated
rom  ‘‘non-core’’  activities,  and  whether  this  division  is
ichotomous.  Getting  a  better  insight  on  this  is  important
ecause,  due  to  the  changing  competitive  landscape,  ﬁrms
re  redeﬁning  their  core  activities,  and  some  activities  pre-
iously  viewed  as  core  activities  are  being  detached  from
f
b
bhe  core  and  started  to  be  also  externalised  (Linares-Navarro
t  al.,  2014).
Although  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  type  of  activity
eing  externalised  will  have  an  impact  on  alliance  deci-
ions  such  as  governance,  preferred  location  or  type  of
artner,  there  are  very  few  studies  that  have  studied  this
ragmentation  of  the  innovation  process  (Howells  et  al.,
008;  Martínez-Noya  et  al.,  2012).  For  this  reason,  research
pportunities  arise  in  the  study  of  how  what  is  being  exter-
alised  inﬂuences  alliance  location  decisions,  the  type  of
artner  preferred,  or  the  governance  of  the  alliance.  How-
ver,  understanding  carefully  what  can  be  externalised  (and
y  extension,  what  should  not)  is  complex.  Externalising
&D  imposes  many  difﬁculties,  which  are  expected  to  be
ven  higher  when  allying  with  partners  in  economies  offer-
ng  low  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  (Zhao,
006).  This  is  so  because  the  ﬁrms’  capability  of  effec-
ively  protecting  the  knowledge  transferred  will  be  lower,
nd  thus  ﬁrms  may  need  to  make  a  higher  use  of  secrecy  as
n  informal  way  to  protect  its  knowledge  (Monteiro  et  al.,
017).
Indeed,  recent  research  has  found  that  the  increased
evel  of  sophistication  of  the  externalised  activities  offers
reater  learning  opportunities  for  the  partners  (Li  et  al.,
010).  Thus  positive  effects  of  increased  interaction  and  col-
aboration  may  come  at  the  cost  of  higher  appropriability
azards,  which  may  lead  partners  to  adopt  safeguards  by
eciding  to  limit  their  interaction  in  order  to  block  unde-
ired  knowledge  leakages  (Kale  et  al.,  2000;  Lado  et  al.,
008).  In  this  line,  Gooris  and  Peeters  (2016)  found  that  when
ffshoring  to  locations  offering  low  protection  of  IPR,  ﬁrms
end  to  fragment  the  operations  entrusted  to  foreign  units,
ssigning  services  with  a  less  strategic  content  as  a  way  to
educe  misappropriation  problems.  Due  to  the  important
mplications  that  the  level  of  sophistication  of  the  exter-
alised  R&D  activities  is  expected  to  have  on  all  alliance
ecisions,  such  as  partner  selection,  or  governance,  we  call
or  future  research  to  make  a  more  ﬁne-grained  distinction
etween  ‘core’  and  ‘non-core’,  or  peripheral,  activities  to
etter  identify  which  are  indeed  the  types  of  R&D  services
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incremental  innovation  (Bunduchi,  2013).  Indeed,  the  pos-
itive  effect  of  being  embedded  within  a  network  shows  anWhat  more  can  we  learn  from  R&D  alliances?  
object  of  these  partnerships.  Indeed,  among  the  few  studies
that  have  analysed  these  practices  at  the  transaction  level
it  has  been  found  that  the  attributes  of  what  is  being  exter-
nalised  has  a  signiﬁcant  impact  on  location  decision.  Doh
et  al.  (2009)  found  that  services  of  a  routine  and  repeti-
tive  nature  are  more  likely  to  be  offshored  to  countries  with
lower  wages.  While  Martínez-Noya  et  al.  (2012)  found  that
R&D  services  requiring  more  tacit  knowledge  are  likely  to
be  externalised  for  knowledge-seeking  motives,  and  to  a
partner  located  in  a  developed  country.
Nonetheless  it  should  be  noted  that,  given  this  increased
fragmentation  and  global  dispersion  of  the  R&D  process,
ﬁrms  that  engage  in  R&D  alliances  need  to  be  able  to  efﬁ-
ciently  perform  the  role  of  systems  integrators,  and  this
requires  considerable  knowledge  if  they  are  to  monitor  their
partners  (Brusoni  et  al.,  2001).  If  they  fail  to  do  so,  ﬁrms  that
rely  too  much  on  externalisation  will  face  the  risk  of  being
hollowed  out  as  a  result  of  losing  competitive  edge  in  critical
areas  (Mudambi  and  Venzin,  2010).  Thus,  despite  the  ﬂex-
ibility  gains  that  can  be  obtained,  ﬁrms  have  to  be  careful
of  not  being  hollowed  out  when  externalising  knowledge-
intensive  activities.  Thus,  when  deciding  the  scope  of  the
alliance  activity  it  should  be  noted  that  R&D  alliances  are
not  an  alternative  to  in-house  R&D,  but  complementary
to  it.  R&D  alliances  do  not  replace  the  need  for  ﬁrms  to
undertake  internal  R&D  activities;  indeed,  they  enhance
it.  This  is  so  because  literature  on  innovation  and  tech-
nology  transfer  has  shown  that  having  access  to  external
knowledge  sources  is  not  sufﬁcient  to  learn  from  them,  in
order  to  do  so,  a  ﬁrm  needs  to  have  the  absorptive  capacity
required  to  assimilate,  integrate  and  exploit  that  external
knowledge  (Cohen  and  Levinthal,  1990).  Indeed,  extensive
literature  has  demonstrated  that  there  is  a  positive  rela-
tionship  between  external  technology  sourcing  and  internal
R&D  (Martínez-Noya  and  García  Canal,  2011;  Mol,  2005;
Veugelers,  1997).  More  technologically  capable  ﬁrms  are
better  equipped  to  avoid  contracting  hazards,  as  their  inter-
nal  technological  capabilities  allow  them  to  select  capable
partners  and  to  better  monitor  their  behaviour  (Mayer  and
Salomon,  2006).  Thus,  those  ﬁrms  lacking  valuable  tech-
nological  resources  will  be  less  well-equipped  to  select  an
appropriate  partner.
In  addition,  as  many  ﬁrms  are  nowadays  the  strategic
centre  of  a  wide  variety  of  alliances  (Kedia  and  Mooty,
2013)  ﬁrms  must  have  skills  or  innovation  capabilities  to
be  able  to  ‘orchestrate’  these  disaggregated  R&D  processes
(Kotabe  and  Mudambi,  2009).  These  innovation  capabili-
ties  encompass  several  crucial  and  interrelated  tasks,  which
include  fostering,  improving,  and  maintaining  the  relation-
ships  between  the  partnership  through  the  processes  related
to  R&D  (Kale  et  al.,  2002)  and  managing  the  knowledge  ﬂows
between  the  partners  (Mooty  and  Kedia,  2014).  However,  we
are  still  not  clear  about  how  to  measure  or  develop  these
orchestration  capabilities  (Asmussen  et  al.,  2016;  Larsen
et  al.,  2013),  and  further  research  is  needed  on  how  ﬁrms
can  develop  these  capabilities  to  explore  more  effective
ways  to  acquire,  transfer,  translate,  transform  and  integrate
external  technological  knowledge,  especially  in  a  portfo-
lio  of  international  R&D  alliances  (Van  de  Ven  and  Zahra,
2016).  This  will  permit  linking  the  alliance  management  lit-
erature  with  that  of  open  innovation  and  offers  promising
opportunities  for  further  research.
i201
ith whom do ﬁrms partner? The role of
ocation
s  it  was  referred  to  in  previous  sections,  depending  on  the
urpose  of  the  R&D  alliance  and  thus  the  type  of  comple-
entary  sought,  ﬁrms  can  opt  to  partner  with  many  different
ctors  such  as  clients,  suppliers,  competitors  or  institutions
Miotti  and  Sachwald,  2003;  van  Beers  and  Zand,  2014)  and
ach  type  of  agent  may  offer  different  impacts  on  innovation
utcomes  (Belderbos  et  al.,  2004;  Nieto  and  Santamaría,
007).  However,  although  research  on  partner  selection  dur-
ng  alliance  formation  is  extensive,  it  is  also  focused  on  some
peciﬁc  drivers.  A  meta-analysis  of  the  literature  of  alliance
ormation  identiﬁed  trust,  partner  commitment,  partner
esource  complementarity,  and  expected  ﬁnancial  payoff  as
he  key  factors  that  inﬂuence  partner  selection  and  subse-
uent  alliance  performance  (Shah  and  Swaminathan,  2008).
verall,  ﬁrms  tend  to  show  a  preference  for  selecting  famil-
ar  partners  (Li  et  al.,  2008) because  trust  lowers  the  cost
f  negotiation,  resolves  conﬂict  (Zaheer  et  al.,  1998)  and
ncreases  information  sharing  (Dyer  and  Chu,  2003).  Through
epeated  ties,  partners  become  familiar  with  each  other  and
evelop  shared  norms  and  a  common  understanding  (Ring
nd  Van  de  Ven,  1994).  The  relational  view  emphasizes  that
ccumulated  trust  and  knowledge  with  a  speciﬁc  partner  is
n  asset  that  can  generate  rents  as  long  as  the  relationship
s  maintained  (Dyer  and  Singh,  1998;  Madhok  and  Tallman,
998).
As  a  consequence,  when  ﬁrms  face  the  decision  to  choose
etween  a  familiar  partner  and  a  stranger,  they  tend  to  show
 preference  for  allying  with  familiar  ones  despite  the  latter
ometimes  offering  a  priori  better  technological  capabili-
ies.  This  is  so  because  even  though  the  stranger  partner
ay  appear  to  offer  upgraded  technological  capabilities,  the
ack  of  trust,  and  thus  the  behavioural  uncertainty  faced,
equires  more  monitoring  efforts  in  order  to  avoid  the  risk  of
nowledge  leakage  and  opportunistic  behaviour  (Anand  and
hanna,  2000;  Arin˜o  et  al.,  2001;  Gulati,  1995;  Zaheer  et  al.,
998).  Indeed,  Hoetker  (2005)  showed  that  as  technologi-
al  uncertainty  increases,  prior  relationships  take  on  greater
ositive  signiﬁcance  relative  to  the  importance  of  technical
apabilities,  as  methods  for  facilitating  smooth  collabora-
ion.  In  line  with  this,  research  on  absorptive  capacity  have
hown  that  prior  interactions  between  partner  ﬁrms  can
ndeed  reduce  the  causal  ambiguity  surrounding  knowledge
ransfer  and  therefore  facilitate  more  effective  and  efﬁcient
ows  of  technological  knowledge  from  one  partner  to  the
ther  (Cohen  and  Levinthal,  1990;  Kale  et  al.,  2000;  Mowery
t  al.,  1996).  However,  this  preference  can  lead  to  the  so
alled  paradox  of  embeddedness  (Uzzi,  1996,  1997).  Over-
oming  the  limitations  of  contextually  localised  search  (and
hus  accessing  novel  resources)  is  particularly  important  for
nnovation  performance  when  the  alliance  activities  to  be
ndertaken  involve  exploration  (Nooteboom  et  al.,  2007).
or  developing  truly  radical  innovations,  overcoming  path-
ependent  learning  becomes  crucial  (Hart  and  Christensen,
002).  Over-reliance  on  trust  and  geographical  proximity
n  selecting  suppliers  for  R&D  leads  to  an  emphasis  onnverse  U-shape  and  to  maximise  performance  ﬁrms  need  to
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ombine  strong  embedded  ties  with  familiar  partners  with
eak  ties  with  partners  outside  its  network.  However,  lit-
le  is  known  about  under  which  circumstances  ﬁrms  are
etter  off  switching  alliance  partners  to  maximise  innova-
ion.  Future  research  opportunities  arise  in  analysing  which
hould  be  the  optimal  degree  of  network  embeddedness  and
nalyse  how  these  global  R&D  networks  evolve  over  time,
specially  when  a  shift  of  technological  paradigms  takes
lace  that  changes  the  ‘‘rules  of  the  game’’  within  an  indus-
ry.
Overall,  ﬁrms  need  to  seek  a  variety  of  technological
nputs,  and  this  means  partnering  with  not  just  ‘tech-
ology  leaders’.  If  this  were  the  case,  asset-augmenting
ctivities  would  remain  the  exclusive  domain  of  only  a  hand-
ul  of  ﬁrms.  As  argued  by  Hagedoorn  and  Duysters  (2002)
hile  selecting  partners  that  are  well-established  players  in
xisting  technologies  may  represent  a  proﬁt  maximising  situ-
tion,  it  is  optimal  only  in  a  static  environment.  In  a dynamic
nvironment,  where  there  is  a  possibility  of  a  technologi-
al  change  (or  even  a  change  in  technological  trajectories),
aving  ties  to  a  wide  group  of  companies,  including  compa-
ies  that  have  yet  to  demonstrate  their  value,  represents  a
igher  learning  potential.  At  the  technology  frontier  where
ominant  technological  designs  have  not  yet  been  deter-
ined  and  several  potential  options  exist,  it  pays  to  have
 number  of  overlapping,  redundant  agreements.  It  may
e  optimal  to  partner  with  all  sorts  of  companies,  even
hose  without  a  demonstrated  track  record.  For  this  rea-
on,  we  argue  that  further  analysis  of  how  ﬁrms  choose
heir  alliance  partners  and  especially  how  their  alliance
etworks  evolve  over  time  when  they  face  technological
hifts  deserves  more  attention  and  offers  promising  research
pportunities.
he  role  of  location
he  decision  of  who  to  partner  with  goes  hand  by  hand
ith  the  location  decision  of  the  alliance  partner.  This  is
o  because  the  appropriability  hazards  perceived  within  an
lliance  are  expected  to  depend  not  only  on  the  character-
stics  of  the  transaction,  but  also  on  the  location  where  the
ransaction  occurs  (Henisz,  2000;  Santangelo  et  al.,  2016).
here  may  be  some  situations  in  which  the  location  deci-
ion  may  come  ﬁrst,  for  example,  for  ﬁrms  that  want  to
orm  an  alliance  with  a  partner  in  a  speciﬁc  location  to
ccess  some  kind  of  location-speciﬁc  advantage  through  the
lliance  partner.  And,  once  decided  the  desired  location,
t  will  decide  with  whom  to  partner  among  the  possible
lternatives  at  that  site.  While,  there  are  others  in  which
t  is  more  important  to  decide  the  type  of  partner  that  it
s  needed  based  on  the  technological  capabilities  it  offers,
ndependently  of  its  location.
Indeed,  apart  from  a  preference  for  familiar  partners,
revious  literature  has  found  a  preference  for  geographi-
ally  proximate  partners.  Firms  forming  R&D  alliances  face
igh  information  costs  due  to  information  asymmetries  (i.e.
igh  costs  of  searching  and  evaluating  alliance  partners)  and
re  thus  subject  to  the  risk  of  adverse  selection  (i.e.  this  is
he  risk  of  not  selecting  the  optimal  partner)  (Reuer  and
ahiri,  2014).  Selecting  a  spatially  proximate  partner  also
ffers  the  advantage  of  facilitating  control,  which  becomes
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ritical  in  R&D  alliances,  where  misappropriation  hazards
re  high  (Li  et  al.,  2008).  As  a  consequence,  R&D  alliance
ormation  tends  to  decline  with  geographic  distance  (Reuer
nd  Lahiri,  2014).  Aligned  with  this,  a  study  by  Capaldo
nd  Petruzzelli  (2014)  on  knowledge-creating  R&D  alliances
hows  that,  although  both  geographic  distance  between
llied  ﬁrms  and  their  afﬁliation  with  the  same  business  group
egatively  affect  the  alliance  innovative  performance,  the
alue  of  both  direct  and  indirect  prior  ties  between  the
xchange  partners  reduces  the  negative  effect  of  geographic
istance  on  R&D  alliance  formation.  This  is  so  because  prior
irect  ties  between  the  exchange  partners,  due  to  collab-
rations  in  the  past,  as  well  as  indirect  ties  that  they  may
ave  through  common  partners,  both  help  reduce  informa-
ion  asymmetries  as  well  as  the  risk  of  adverse  selection
ecause  they  will  have  access  to  better  information  on
he  real  resources  and  capabilities  of  the  potential  partner
Zaheer  et  al.,  2010).
One  stream  of  research  that  offers  promising  opportuni-
ies  is  the  analysis  of  whether  R&D  alliances  can  substitute
r  complement  collocation  in  a  particular  region.  Previous
esearch  has  found  that  ﬁrms  collocate  with  other  ﬁrms  so
s  to  be  able  to  internalise  location-speciﬁc  advantages  and
nhance  a  ﬁrm’s  innovativeness,  or  avoid  collocation  so  as
o  limit  the  possibility  of  unintended  knowledge  leakages
Alcácer,  2006;  Narula  and  Santangelo,  2009,  2012).  This  is
o  because  R&D  activities  are  knowledge-based  activities
nd  tend  to  be  location-bound,  some  locations  may  offer
pecialised  knowledge  or  capabilities  on  a speciﬁc  techno-
ogical  domain  (Cantwell  and  Santangelo,  1999).  In  fact,  it
as  been  demonstrated  that  one  of  the  key  motives  for  ﬁrms
o  geographically  distribute  their  R&D  activities  is  the  will-
ngness  to  access  knowledge  spillovers  (Feinberg  and  Gupta,
004;  Lahiri,  2010).  When  a  ﬁrm  wishes  to  beneﬁt  from
ocation-speciﬁc  assets,  it  can  establish  an  afﬁliate  in  that
ocation,  because  beneﬁts  generally  accrue  from  physical
roximity  to  the  ﬁrm  or  cluster.  However,  it  is  also  true
hat  technology  spillovers  through  collocation  can  be  highly
ostly  and  require  a  long-term  horizon,  because  linkages
evelop  gradually  over  time.  This  means  that  in  sectors
here  innovation  is  dynamic,  a  wholly  owned  subsidiary  may
ot  provide  a  fast-enough  response,  whereas  the  use  of  M&A
ay  be  even  less  attractive  when  the  technological  area
here  the  complementary  resources  sought  only  covers  a
mall  area  of  the  ﬁrm’s  interests.  As  a  result,  in  order  to  tap
hese  foreign  external  resources  and  access  this  specialised
echnological  expertise,  ﬁrms  may  ﬁnd  it  convenient  to  ally
ith  a  partner  located  within  such  economies.  It  should  be
oted  that  international  alliances  can  allow  ﬁrms  to  access
ountry-speciﬁc  advantages  embedded  in  their  collaborative
artners,  and  thus  R&D  alliances  can  be  considered  as  a  vehi-
le  for  tapping  into  the  comparative  advantages  of  foreign
ountries.
In  this  sense,  recent  literature  has  emerged  focusing
n  analysing  whether  international  R&D  alliances  substitute
r  complement  collocation  to  internalise  location-speciﬁc
dvantages  (Narula  and  Santangelo,  2009).  Such  economic
eography  inspired  studies  share  the  emphasis  that  ﬁrms’
nnovative  activities  show  a  ‘‘spatial  stickiness’’  and,  for
his  reason,  location  is  a primary  determinant  of  the  com-
etencies  a ﬁrm  possesses  (Iammarino  and  McCann,  2006).
hey  suggest  that  location  (or  collocation)  has  an  indirect
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effect  on  the  choice  of  partner  because  of  the  role  of  infor-
mal  institutions  in  collaborations,  which  results  in  ﬁrms
becoming  embedded  in  relationships  that  ﬁrms  have  a nat-
ural  tendency  to  perpetuate  with  other  collocated  ﬁrms
and  organisations.  Firms  belonging  to  the  same  spatially
localised  social  network  are  ‘‘likely  to  have  a  greater  aware-
ness  of  the  rules,  routines,  and  procedures  each  follows’’
(Gulati,  1998:  304),  which  improves  knowledge  transfer
and  reduces  the  risk  of  opportunistic  behaviours  within
the  network.  Indeed,  there  is  evidence  that  shows  that
multinational  ﬁrms  locate  asset-augmenting  R&D  facilities
in  offshore  locations  mainly  with  the  intention  of  exploiting
the  beneﬁts  that  derive  from  collocation  (Blanc  and  Sierra,
1999;  Criscuolo  et  al.,  2005).  Despite  this,  it  is  important
to  note  that  not  all  ﬁrms  like  proximity.  Some  ﬁrms  tend  to
avoid  collocation  with  the  purpose  of  minimising  undesired
knowledge  spillovers  and  leakage  of  valuable  technological
assets.  Alcácer  (2006)  found  that  despite  the  higher  concen-
tration  of  R&D  facilities  compared  to  manufacturing  or  sales,
more-capable  ﬁrms  collocate  less  than  less-capable  ones,
regardless  of  the  activity  because  more-capable  ﬁrms  have
more  to  lose  than  to  gain  from  clustering.  For  instance,  more
technologically  advanced  ﬁrms  prefer  to  locate  close  to  uni-
versities,  and  are  less  interested  in  locating  proximate  to
rivals,  whereas  less  competitive  ﬁrms  are  more  willing  to
collocate  with  other  ﬁrms  in  the  same  industry  (Alcácer  and
Chung,  2007).  Narula  and  Santangelo  (2009)  shown  that  R&D
alliances  have  the  potential  to  act  as  a  substitute  for  colloca-
tion  where  ﬁrms  are  not  located  in  the  same  cluster,  while  at
the  same  time  these  alliances  enable  ﬁrms  to  directly  mon-
itor  knowledge  exchange  with  their  collocated  partners  and
to  access  complementary  capabilities,  thus  alliances  acting
as  a  complement  to  collocation.  In  addition,  Martínez-Noya
and  García-Canal  (2018)  results  suggest  that  allying  with
shared  R&D  suppliers  that  also  serve  competitors  can  mimic
the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  being  collocated  with
them,  especially  when  the  shared  supplier  is  located  in  a
country  offering  weak  intellectual  property  rights  protec-
tion.  Nevertheless,  more  studies  are  needed  in  order  to
clarify  under  what  circumstances  R&D  alliances  complement
or  substitute  collocation  taking  into  account  with  whom  the
ﬁrm  is  allying,  where  and  for  what  purpose.
In  addition,  promising  opportunities  arise  from  studies
analysing  the  interplay  between  R&D  alliance  management
and  the  IB  literature.  Each  country  or  region  offers  different
location-speciﬁc  advantages,  as  well  as  imply  different  gov-
ernance  risks.  However,  as  some  IB  studies  have  shown,  ﬁrms
differ  in  their  attitudes  towards  risk  depending  on  where
the  ﬁrm  comes  from,  the  type  of  ﬁrm,  or  its  international
experience  (García-Canal  and  Guillén,  2008).  For  example,
Cuervo-Cazurra  (2006)  suggests  that  ﬁrms  who  have  been
exposed  to  bribery  at  home  may  not  be  deterred  by  corrup-
tion  abroad,  but  instead  seek  countries  where  corruption  is
prevalent.  Thus,  the  country  of  origin  of  ﬁrms  may  shape
the  risks  they  perceive  and  thus  the  governance  mode  cho-
sen  for  their  R&D  operations,  as  well  as  their  alliance  partner
decisions  (Awate  et  al.,  2015;  Narula  and  Sadowski,  2002).
Indeed,  research  opportunities  arise  from  studying  how  ﬁrms
from  emerging  countries  may  differ  in  their  R&D  decisions
as  they  may  face  and  solve  the  alliance  dilemmas  described
in  a  different  way  compared  to  ﬁrms  from  developed
countries.
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ow do ﬁrms organise their R&D alliances? A
hift to contractual and non-equity
greements
he  alliance  governance  literature  deals  with  how  part-
ers  negotiating  alliances  choose  a  structure  depending
n  the  level  of  communication  and  coordination  desired
Contractor  et  al.,  2010).  Previous  research  has  tried
o  answer  this  question  analysing  which  should  be  the
ost  appropriate  R&D  alliance  governance  structure  to  be
dopted  by  ﬁrms  depending  on  several  ﬁrm,  technological
r  country  factors.  Nonetheless,  despite  the  wide  variety
f  R&D  alliance  forms,  most  previous  empirical  research
uring  the  90s  focused  only  on  studying  broad  governance
hoices.  On  the  one  hand,  certain  scholars  have  focused  on
ddressing  whether  and  when  ﬁrms  should  adopt  contrac-
ual  versus  a  hierarchical  R&D  modes  (Carson  et  al.,  2006;
agedoorn  and  Hesen,  2007).  Others  have  focused  on  the
ecision  to  opt  for  equity  versus  non-equity  governance  R&D
odes  (Contractor  and  Woodley,  2009;  García-Canal  et  al.,
008;  Osborn  and  Baughn,  1990;  Oxley,  1997;  Oxley  and
ada,  2009).  Although  cooperation  on  R&D  is  not  a  new  phe-
omenon,  in  recent  decades  there  has  been  a clear  shift
owards  an  increasing  use  of  contractual  and  non-equity
greements  through  the  adoption  of  more  open  innovation
trategies  (Santamaría  et  al.,  2010),  so  analysing  how  to
anage  this  alliance  portfolio  deserves  special  attention.
his  means  that  studies  should  move  from  analysing  broad
overnance  choices  to  what  drive  ﬁrms  to  choose  among
ifferent  non-equity  contractual  modes  (Martínez-Noya  and
arcia-Canal,  2012).
A  key  question  when  negotiating  and  designing  an  R&D
lliance  is  to  determine  the  degree  or  communication
nd  coordination  that  the  partners  want  to  have  with
ach  other  to  limit  the  risk  of  opportunistic  behaviours
hile  fostering  innovation.  Indeed,  setting  the  right  band-
idth  or  scope  of  interaction  among  partners  can  be
ery  challenging  for  managers  and  is  a  research  topic  of
igh  interest  (Contractor  et  al.,  2011;  Grimpe  and  Kaiser,
010;  Oxley  and  Sampson,  2004;  Tallman  and  Phene,  2007;
hang  and  Baden-Fuller,  2010).  This  is  so  because  the
sually  tacit  nature  of  the  knowledge  exchanged  within
hese  alliances  engender  knowledge  transfer  problems.  To
itigate  those  problems  managers  must  adopt  relationship-
peciﬁc  investments  or  knowledge  management  practices
hat  are  increasingly  co-specialised  as  the  degree  of  tacit
nowledge  and  problem-solving  complexity  increases  (Ashok
t  al.,  2016;  Heiman  and  Nickerson,  2004).  Such  invest-
ents  and  practices,  like  high  bandwidth  communication
hannels  among  partners  that  allow  for  higher  intensity  of
ommunication  and  interaction,  and  communication  codes
hat  are  increasingly  co-specialised,  are  expected  to  help
artners  develop  a  better  understanding  of  each  other’s
ultures  and  management  systems,  thus  enhancing  coordi-
ation  and  conﬂict  resolution  (Heiman  and  Nickerson,  2004).
n  other  words,  through  the  establishment  of  these  prac-
ices  and  investments  partners  try  to  establish  ‘‘ex  ante’’
he  level  of  interaction  and  communication  to  exist  among
hem.  This  knowledge  (as  well  as  the  trust  generated  with
t)  is  a  valuable  asset  that  can  provide  partners  with  a  com-
etitive  advantage  (Dyer  and  Hatch,  2006;  Dyer  and  Singh,
21
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998;  Madhok  and  Tallman,  1998;  Mesquita  et  al.,  2008).
owever,  these  relationship-speciﬁc  investments,  especially
hose  that  are  of  an  intangible  nature,4 may  act  as  a
ouble-edged  sword  as  they  may  give  rise  to  contracting
azards  (Martínez-Noya  et  al.,  2013)  and  create  an  ‘inter-
rganisational  learning  dilemma’  (Larsson  et  al.,  1998).  This
ilemma  implies  that  although  maintaining  relationships
hat  foster  knowledge  sharing  in  an  open  innovation  context
re  beneﬁcial  (Chesbrough,  2003;  Fey  and  Birkinshaw,  2005;
oetker,  2005),  extensive  knowledge  sharing  may  result
n  a  loss  of  competitive  edge  due  to  outgoing  knowledge
eakages  (Kale  et  al.,  2000;  Lado  et  al.,  2008).  These  acci-
ental  knowledge  leakages  occur  when  a  ﬁrm’s  employee
ccidentally  exposes  business-critical  knowledge  not  meant
o  be  shared  with  external  parties  (Ritala  et  al.,  2015).
or  instance,  trade  secrets  may  spillover  should  employees
eveal  more  than  what  is  necessary.  Accidental  leaks  can
egatively  moderate  the  positive  effect  of  external  knowl-
dge  sharing  on  innovation  performance  (Martínez-Noya  and
arcía-Canal,  2018;  Ritala  et  al.,  2015).
Therefore,  when  governing  R&D  alliances,  it  can  be
aid  that  ﬁrms  face  the  tension  between  knowledge  shar-
ng  and  knowledge  expropriation  (Heiman  and  Nickerson,
004)  because  they  need  to  maintain  the  necessary  knowl-
dge  exchange  to  achieve  their  innovation  objectives,
hile  simultaneously  being  able  to  safeguard  against  the
isappropriation  of  knowledge  that  these  co-specialised
nvestments  make  accessible  (Grimpe  and  Kaiser,  2010;
xley  and  Sampson,  2004;  Ritala  et  al.,  2015).  How  seri-
us  this  threat  is  has  been  shown  to  be  dependent  on:
1)  the  extent  to  which  the  partner  has  access  to  comple-
entary  assets  necessary  to  exploit  that  knowledge;  and
2)  the  chances  that  the  knowledge  transferred  within  the
lliance  will  leak  to  competitors  through  a  common  part-
er  (Martínez-Noya  and  García-Canal,  2015,  2018).  This  fact
ould  explain  why  within  vertical  R&D  alliances  some  suppli-
rs  are  willing  to  make  unilateral  commitments  in  the  form
f  relationship-speciﬁc  investments  without  economic  safe-
uards  (Kang  et  al.,  2009).  In  effect,  these  agreements  may
volve  towards  what  Hamel  (1991)  calls  learning  races.  In
hese  alliances,  each  ﬁrm  tries  to  speed  up  its  learning  rate
o  be  the  ﬁrst  partner  capable  of  leaving  the  agreement,  and
n  this  way  become  the  one  with  the  strongest  competitive
osition.
Research  opportunities  arise  on  analysing  speciﬁc  varia-
les  that  may  determine  or  moderate  the  optimal  degree
f  scope  or  bandwidth  to  be  adopted.  This  is  so  because
lthough  there  is  agreement  on  the  beneﬁts  that  acces-
ing  external  knowledge  may  have  on  innovativeness,  recent
tudies  highlight  the  dark  side  of  such  openness  to  exter-
al  agents,  so  more  evidence  on  its  effect  on  innovation  is
4 Based on Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995), Martínez-Noya
t al. (2013) posit that a distinction can be made among those
elationship-speciﬁc investments of a tangible nature----physical
pecialised investments in tooling or equipment----and those more
ntangible or ‘‘soft’’ relationally-oriented investments----that is,
nvestments in processes, procedures and people that are speciﬁc
o the requirements of the partner. While the tangible ones are
xpected to generate hold-up hazards, the intangible ones give
oom for higher appropriability hazards.
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eeded  (Monteiro  et  al.,  2017).  Therefore,  literature  should
ove  from  analysing  broad  categories  of  governance  forms
o  focus  more  on  the  interaction  mechanisms  or  knowledge
anagement  practices  to  be  adopted  between  partners  so  as
o  maximise  value  creation  and  appropriation  of  new  tech-
ologies  developed  within  the  alliance.  In  this  sense,  a  study
y  Contractor  et  al.  (2011)  has  shown  that  variables  related
o:  (1)  the  characteristics  of  the  technology  exchanged;
2)  the  coordination  costs  and  risks  faced  (due  to  partner’s
ehaviour  as  well  as  country  risk);  (3)  agreement  provisions
such  as  territorial  restrictions,  standardisation  of  contract
erms  or  exclusivity  of  partnership);  and  (4)  ﬁrm  and  sec-
or  characteristics  (like  ﬁrm  experience  with  alliances  and
artner  availability),  may  all  have  an  effect  on  the  optimal
egree  of  alliance  interaction.
In  the  same  vein,  studies  focusing  on  variables  that
an  act  as  moderators  of  the  optimal  bandwidth  to  be
dopted  to  maximise  innovativeness  are  needed.  For  exam-
le,  because  ﬁrms  establish  R&D  alliances  with  a  variety
f  partners  (such  as  suppliers,  competitors  or  universi-
ies)  with  different  underlying  motivational  or  strategic
rientations,  studying  how  the  type  of  partner  may  mod-
rate  the  optimal  bandwidth  to  be  adopted  is  another
romising  research  line.  Non-proﬁts  have  different  motiva-
ional  or  strategic  orientation  (Li  et  al.,  2010)  which  means
hat  they  have  lower  incentives  to  apply  the  knowledge
ained  via  the  alliance  to  markets  or  products  outside  of
he  agreed-upon  scope  (Martínez-Noya  et  al.,  2013).  Simi-
arly,  sharing  suppliers  with  competitors  may  aggravate  the
nter-organisational  learning  dilemma  (Martínez-Noya  and
arcía-Canal,  2015,  2018).  Aligned  with  this,  another  fac-
or  to  be  taken  into  account  is  how  the  number  of  partners
ithin  the  R&D  alliance  inﬂuences  governance  choices  and
ormalisation  of  contracts.  Increasing  the  number  of  R&D
lliance  partners  introduces  more  complexities  to  effec-
ively  manage  the  inter-organisational  learning  dilemma
hich  implies  that  the  optimal  governance  mechanism  for
ultilateral  R&D  alliances  may  differ  from  that  for  bilateral
nes.  When  cooperating  with  rivals,  this  learning  dilemma
eaches  its  maximum  expression.  Thus,  it  would  be  inter-
sting  to  integrate  competitive  strategy  considerations  into
lliance  literature  to  analyse  issues  such  as  how  ﬁrms  com-
ete  for  the  value  that  they  create  within  the  R&D  alliance,
nd  how  alliances  with  rivals  emerge  within  industries  and
ow  these  networks  evolve  over  time  (Contractor  and  Reuer,
014).
Indeed,  it  should  be  noted  that  a  ﬁrm’s  belonging  to
 particular  network  may  act  as  a  signal  of  its  quality  or
eputation,  thus  reducing  the  risk  of  adverse  selection.  In
his  vein,  a  recent  study  by  Choi  and  Contractor  (2016)
xplored  national,  industry  and  ﬁrm  factors  that  determine
he  selection  of  an  appropriate  R&D  alliance  governance
ode.  Using  a  sample  of  international  alliance  deals  within
he  pharma  industry  they  found  that  the  likelihood  of  using
 more-integrated  alliance  governance  mode  decreased  as
he  difference  or  ‘‘distance’’  between  nations  of  the  part-
er  ﬁrms  increased  in  terms  of  human  capital  and  cultural
istance.  While  a  greater  geographic  and  institutional  dif-
erence  among  partners  was  positively  associated  with  the
election  of  more  integrated  alliance  governance  modes.
lthough  the  chronological  order  of  the  governance  and
ocation  decisions  is  still  a  subject  of  debate,  it  is  obvious
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that  these  two  decisions  are  closely  related.  It  should  be
noted  that  the  location  of  the  partner  (whether  the  alliance
partner  is  institutionally  distant  or  not)  may  have  a  signif-
icant  inﬂuence  of  the  governance  of  the  alliance.  In  this
sense,  the  literature  on  cooperation  highlights  the  impor-
tance  of  the  institutional  context  where  an  alliance  takes
place.  From  a  transaction  cost  approach,  it  is  well  known
that  sharing  the  same  institutional  context  and  a  common
organisational  culture  allows  for  more  intensive  commu-
nication  between  partners  (Heiman  and  Nickerson,  2004).
Therefore,  research  opportunities  emerge  to  study  how  the
location  of  partners  inﬂuences  the  degree  of  communication
to  be  adopted,  and  its  impact  on  alliance  innovativeness.
Despite  this,  there  exists  scarce  research  dealing  simulta-
neously  with  both  decisions  (Hätönen,  2009;  Martínez-Noya
et  al.,  2012;  Nieto  and  Rodríguez,  2011;  Rodríguez  and
Nieto,  2016).  This  is  an  important  research  gap.  Future
research  needs  to  focus  on  combining  both  the  IB  and  man-
agement  streams  of  literature  and  elaborate  on  the  factors
that  drive  ﬁrms  to  externalise  R&D  services  to  a  particu-
lar  location  and  under  what  governance  form.  Although  it  is
known  that  greater  enforceability  of  contracts  overseas  has
allowed  for  the  increasing  dispersion  of  these  agreements
(Narula  and  Hagedoorn,  1999),  there  is  little  empirical  evi-
dence  explicitly  analysing  the  determining  factors  of  how
the  location  of  the  R&D  alliance  partners  inﬂuence  the  gov-
ernance  of  these  agreements.
The  relevance  of  contracts
The  high  failure  rate  of  alliances  means  that  careful  contract
design  is  key.  However,  because  designing  and  implementing
contractual  safeguards  may  be  too  costly,  complex,  and/or
difﬁcult  to  enforce,  such  clauses  may  not  fully  protect  ﬁrms
from  misappropriation  risks  (Diestre  and  Rajagopalan,  2012;
Dushnitsky  and  Shaver,  2009;  Katila  et  al.,  2008).  For  this
reason,  identifying  which  are  indeed  the  most  effective  con-
tractual  clauses  partners  can  use  to  protect  them  from  these
risks,  while  allowing  them  to  achieve  their  innovative  objec-
tives,  is  indeed  an  important  direction  for  future  research.
A  recent  stream  of  literature  has  started  to  analyse
contract  provisions  in  more  detail,  and  how  these  can  inﬂu-
ence  the  post-formation  governance  of  the  alliance  and  the
exchanges  between  the  partners  (Arin˜o  et  al.,  2014;  Reuer
and  Arin˜o,  2007;  Ryall  and  Sampson,  2009;  Lumineau  and
Malhotra,  2011).  To  analyse  how  contract  design  shapes
alliance  management,  new  research  opportunities  arise  in
the  use  of  new  theoretical  frames.  Recent  literature  has
emerged  that  calls  for  incorporating  insights  from  psychol-
ogy  to  study  how  ﬁrms  can  design  and  govern  R&D  alliances
(Weber  and  Mayer,  2014).  This  is  so  because  while  trans-
action  costs  theory  is  very  useful  in  illustrating  how  to
avoid  misappropriation  hazards  within  these  alliances,  it  is
focused  on  preventing  a  negative  behaviour  (limiting  oppor-
tunism  and  misunderstandings)  while  innovation  is  very
much  concerned  about  creating  a  positive  attitude.  In  other
words,  transaction  costs  theory  is  less  able  to  explain  how  to
design  contracts  that  can  help  foster  a  positive  environment
that  enhances  innovation.
Future  research  needs  to  acknowledge  that  contracts  can
do  more  than  simply  eliminate  negative  outcomes  and  can
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elp  set  a  frame  that  can  encourage  a  positive  outcome.
or  instance,  regulatory  focus  theory  suggests  that  indi-
iduals  can  choose  one  of  two  ways  to  pursue  their  goals.
hey  can  focus  on  achieving  positive  outcomes  (a  promo-
ion  focus),  or  by  avoiding  negative  outcomes  (a  prevention
ocus)  (Higgins,  1998).  These  different  regulatory  foci  apply
ot  only  at  the  individual  level,  but  also  in  exchange  rela-
ionships  (Das  and  Kumar,  2011).  Based  on  this,  recent  works
Weber  and  Mayer,  2011;  Weber  et  al.,  2011) have  shown
ow  the  framing  of  alliance  contracts  may  shape  alliance
utcomes  because  they  argue  that  contracts  can  play  a  role
y  helping  set  the  frame  under  which  the  transaction  will
e  executed.  As  argued  by  Wang  and  Rajagopalan  (2014)
he  same  reasoning  can  be  applied  to  study  the  antecedents
nd  consequences  of  managerial  perceptions  in  the  broader
ontext  of  alliance  capability  investments.  Those  alliance
elations  perceived  by  ﬁrms  as  being  ﬁlled  with  contractual
azards  may  tend  to  invest  more  in  capabilities  to  prevent
alue  capture  by  partners,  while  ﬁrms  that  have  more  posi-
ive  expectations  may  invest  more  in  capabilities  to  create
alue.
In  addition,  more  research  is  needed  to  analyse  how
amiliarity  with  the  R&D  alliance  partner  inﬂuences  contract
ength  and  complexity  because  it  is  not  at  all  clear  whether
rust  and  contracts  are  substitutes  or  complements.  Some
tudies  have  argued  that  trust  and  familiarity  with  a  speciﬁc
artner  leads  to  a  lower  need  of  designing  complex  contracts
Malhotra  and  Murnighan,  2002;  Woolthuis  et  al.,  2005).
owever,  other  studies  state  that  familiarity  can  also  lead
o  more  complex  and  lengthy  contracts  (Arin˜o  et  al.,  2014;
ayer  and  Argyres,  2004).  Their  argument  is  that  familiar
artners  know  each  other  better,  so  they  are  able  to  under-
tand  the  most  important  contingencies  that  can  occur,  and
hey  feel  more  comfortable  providing  contract  details  on
ow  to  allocate  tasks  and  coordination  provisions.  In  other
ords,  through  repeated  ties  partners  learn  to  contract  with
ach  other.
We  have  a lot  to  learn  about  how  alliances  are  nego-
iated,  and  the  factors  that  matter  in  designing  the
egotiations.  For  instance,  how  the  availability  of  other
lternative  suitable  potential  partners  may  inﬂuence  the
egotiation  process  (Contractor  et  al.,  2011).  Similarly,
iven  that  the  value  of  the  technological  knowledge  pro-
ided  by  the  partners  at  the  beginning  of  the  alliance  may
rode  over  time,  it  would  be  very  interesting  to  take  a  lon-
itudinal  perspective  and  focus  on  analysing  how  the  power
alance  may  shift  between  the  R&D  alliance  partners  over
he  course  of  their  collaborative  agreement.
he effect of R&D alliances on innovation and
nancial performance
n  relation  to  the  effects  that  R&D  alliances  may  have
n  ﬁrms’  performance,  research  has  demonstrated  that
ncreasing  the  breadth  of  knowledge  sources  accessed  posi-
ively  impacts  innovation  performance  (Faems  et  al.,  2005;
eiponen  and  Helfat,  2010;  Miotti  and  Sachwald,  2003).
ach  partner  has  been  shown  to  offer  different  comple-
entary  knowledge  and  synergetic  effects,  so  accessing  and
ntegrating  knowledge  and  capabilities  from  diverse  part-
ers  has  been  found  to  signiﬁcantly  contribute  to  innovation
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R&D  alliance  portfolio,  and  thus  the  likelihood  of  alliance06  
erformance  (Belderbos  et  al.,  2004;  Nieto  and  Santamaría,
007;  van  Beers  and  Zand,  2014).  Furthermore,  it  has
een  found  that  more  successful  innovations  take  place
hen  ﬁrms  access  knowledge  from  different  technological
omains  and  geographic  locations  (Ahuja  and  Katila,  2001;
aursen  and  Salter,  2006;  Lavie  and  Miller,  2008).
In  relation  to  this,  less  literature  exists  analysing  the
mpact  that  R&D  collaboration  may  have  on  the  degree  of
ovelty  of  the  innovations  achieved.  For  example,  Nieto  and
antamaría  (2007)  found  that  collaboration  with  suppliers
ad  the  greatest  impact  on  the  novelty  of  the  innovation,
ollowed  by  collaboration  with  clients  and  research  organi-
ations;  while  collaboration  with  competitors  had  a  negative
mpact.  In  this  line  it  has  been  shown  that  collaborating  with
rospective  users  contribute  more  to  radical  innovations,
hile  collaborating  with  existing  users  contribute  more  to
ore  incremental  product  innovations  (Ashok  et  al.,  2016).
n  et  al.  (2010)  contribute  to  this  line  of  research  suggest-
ng  that  it  is  the  ease  of  knowledge  access,  rather  than
readth  of  knowledge,  what  appears  to  also  drive  the  suc-
ess  of  R&D  collaborations  for  product  innovation.  Similarly,
he  location  of  the  alliance  partner  is  also  expected  to  shape
nnovation  performance  because  partners  located  in  for-
ign  regions  are  embedded  in  different  national  innovation
ystems  having  thus  access  to  location-speciﬁc  resources
Miotti  and  Sachwald,  2003).  Indeed,  having  geographically
iverse  partners  can  help  ﬁrms  to  better  adapt  their  prod-
cts  to  foreign  markets,  which  contributes  to  innovation
erformance  (Lavie  and  Miller,  2008;  van  Beers  and  Zand,
014).
Although  more  extensive  literature  has  analysed  the
mpact  of  collaboration  on  innovation  performance,  less
mpirical  evidence  is  found  in  relation  to  the  effects  that
&D  alliances  may  have  on  ﬁrms’  ﬁnancial  performance.
n  this  sense,  Belderbos  et  al.  (2004)  analysed  the  effect
f  collaboration  with  different  types  of  partners  on  labour
roductivity  and  productivity  in  innovative  (new  to  the
arket)  sales  and  they  found  that  cooperation  with  both
ompetitor  and  supplier  focus  on  incremental  innovations,
mproving  productivity  performance.  Cooperation  with  uni-
ersities  and  competitors  contribute  to  create  innovations
enerating  sales  of  novel  products,  while  customers  and
niversities  are  important  sources  of  knowledge  for  ﬁrms
ursuing  radical  innovations  and  facilitate  growth  in  inno-
ative  sales.  Similarly,  Surroca  and  Santamaría  (2007)  also
ound  that  vertical,  horizontal  or  institutional  cooperation
ave  different  impacts  on  ﬁrm  performance,  and  shown  that
nnovative  results  positively  impact  ﬁrm  performance.  In
articular,  they  found  that  while  innovation  results  medi-
te  the  relationship  between  institutional  cooperation  and
rm  performance,  vertical  cooperation  has  both  a  direct
nd  an  indirect  effect  on  performance.  Very  interestingly,
hey  found  that  horizontal  cooperation  (i.e.  with  rivals)
ad  a  negative  effect  on  innovation  results  as  well  as  on
rm  performance.  This  result  can  be  however  explained  by
antamaria  and  Surroca  (2011)  as  collaboration  with  rivals  is
sually  motivated  by  the  desire  to  carry  out  pre-competitive
esearch,  which  may  not  necessarily  have  a  direct  impact  on
nnovation  performance.Nevertheless,  we  believe  that  this  relationship  between
iversity  and  performance  is  not  so  straightforward.  It
hould  be  noted  that  although  having  more  diverse  partners
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an  enhance  potential  learning  beneﬁts,  the  coordination
osts  and  the  complexity  of  managing  the  ﬁrm’s  R&D  alliance
ortfolio  are  expected  to  be  also  greater.  This  means  that,
s  argued  by  Jiang  et  al.  (2010), ﬁrms  should  manage  their
lliances  with  a  portfolio  perspective,  trying  to  maximise
esource  and  learning  beneﬁts  by  allying  with  a  variety  of
artners  in  various  value  chain  activities  while  minimising
anagerial  costs  through  a focused  set  of  governance  struc-
ures.  Therefore,  in  order  to  be  able  to  take  advantage  of
artner  diversity,  ﬁrms  should  have  the  required  capabili-
ies  in  terms  of  prior  experience  in  alliances,  technological
apabilities,  or  appropriate  IT  applications  to  facilitate  col-
aboration  (Jiang  et  al.,  2010).  However,  more  studies  are
eeded  to  study  the  effect  of  other  variables  that  may
oderate  the  relationship  between  partner  diversity  and
nnovation  and  ﬁnancial  performance,  such  as  those  related
o  the  ﬁrms’  strategy,  institutional  environment,  or  sector.
or  example,  a  recent  study  by  Cuervo-Cazurra  et  al.  (2017)
uggests  that  the  relative  importance  of  diversity  and  con-
rol  of  knowledge  on  innovation  performance  depends  on  the
ources  of  ﬁnance,  and  that  alternative  sources  of  ﬁnance
oderate  the  relationships:  internal  funds  strengthen  the
mpact  of  R&D  sources  with  more  diversity  of  knowledge  on
he  sale  of  new  products,  while  external  funds  strengthen
he  impact  of  R&D  sources  with  more  control  of  knowledge.
Over  time,  ﬁrms  combine  different  exploration  or
xploitation  motivations  when  designing  their  R&D  alliance
ortfolio,  which  means  that  depending  on  the  ﬁrms’
otivations,  the  level  of  partner  diversity  and  optimal
onﬁguration  of  the  R&D  alliance  activity  may  change
Santamaria  and  Surroca,  2011).  Thus,  more  studies  are
eeded  to  understand  how  the  type  of  partner  diversity
functional,  geographic,  network  position,  technological
eadership,  etc.)  and  governance  structures  should  evolve
ver  time  to  maximise  both  innovation  and  ﬁnancial  per-
ormance  as  the  ﬁrms’  technological  orientation  between
xploitation  and  exploration  motivations  changes.
onclusion: implications for  future research
esearch  on  R&D  alliances  has  been  focused  on  broad  topics
uch  as  discrete  governance  choices  decisions,  motives  for
ollaboration,  location  decisions,  or  partner  selection  deci-
ions.  However,  the  review  of  the  literature  allowed  us  to
dentify  some  new  trends  on  R&D  cooperation  during  these
ast  decades  that  suggest  that  the  most  interesting  research
pportunities  result  from  the  interlinkages  between  these
uestions.  To  summarise,  we  have  seen  a  dramatic  increase
f  non-equity  modes  of  governance  for  technological  activ-
ties  (Narula  and  Martinez-Noya,  2015;  van  Kranenburg
t  al.,  2014).  At  the  same  time,  alliances  have  become
ispersed  worldwide,  formed  with  partners  in  both  devel-
ped  countries  as  well  as  in  developing  ones  (Martínez-Noya
t  al.,  2012;  Nieto  and  Rodríguez,  2011;  Zhao,  2006).  They
lso  involve  more  complex  activities  that  require  a  higher
ntensity  of  cooperation  (Contractor  et  al.,  2010).  All  these
rends  increase  the  complexity  of  effectively  managing  theailure.  Therefore,  it  is  not  a  surprise  that  despite  the  poten-
ial  beneﬁts  that  R&D  alliances  may  offer,  we  have  seen  that
here  are  many  ﬁrms  that  are  not  able  to  reach  the  expected
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objectives  because  they  do  not  know  how  to  manage  these
increasingly  complex  agreements  surrounded  by  high  levels
of  technological  and  behavioural  uncertainty  (Lhuillery  and
Pﬁster,  2009;  Lokshin  et  al.,  2011).
Due  to  this  changing  landscape  that  adds  complexity  to
the  phenomenon,  we  argue  that  future  research  on  R&D
alliances  require  us  to  move  from  broad  research  questions
towards  analysing  the  details  and  development  of  these
agreements  by  taking  a  multidisciplinary  approach.  Over-
all,  throughout  the  paper  we  identiﬁed  different  areas  that
offer  promising  opportunities  for  future  research.  However,
among  all  the  opportunities  identiﬁed,  we  would  like  to  sum-
marise  the  following  key  ones  that  in  our  opinion  offer  the
most  interesting  opportunities:
• Integrate  theories  from  behavioural  sciences  to  better
understand  the  role  of  managers’  perceptions  on  different
R&D  alliance  decisions.  Recent  scholars  have  consid-
ered  psychological  or  behavioural  disciplines  (Das  and
Kumar,  2011;  Tyler  and  Caner,  2016).  Future  research
can  continue  with  this  stream  by  considering  managers’
expectations  or  aspirations  in  R&D  alliance  formation
decisions.
•  Understand  at  the  transaction  level  how  the  scope  of  col-
laboration  is  determined  and  the  effects  of  this  decision
on  the  selection  of  partners  and  governance  modes.  Pre-
vious  studies  such  as  Li  et  al.  (2008)  or  Martínez-Noya  and
García-Canal  (2018)  provide  good  examples  of  how  the
characteristics  of  what  is  externalised  may  inﬂuence  part-
ner  decisions.  However,  more  studies  are  needed  to  shed
more  light  on  the  interrelationship  among  these  ques-
tions.
•  Analyse  how  the  location  of  the  partner  inﬂuences  the
governance  of  the  agreement,  and/or  the  type  of  part-
ner  to  be  chosen.  We  consider  that  more  works  are
needed  from  IB  scholars  following  works  such  as  those
of  Gooris  and  Peeters  (2016),  Hagedoorn  et  al.  (2005)  or
van  Kranenburg  et  al.  (2014),  taking  a  multidisciplinary
approach.
•  Analyse  whether  international  R&D  alliances  substitute
or  complement  collocation  to  internalise  location-speciﬁc
advantages.  Despite  some  studies  have  considered  this
line  of  research  (Narula  and  Santangelo,  2009),  more
investigation  is  needed  to  understand  in  which  circum-
stances  they  function  in  one  way  or  another.  Aspects  such
as  who  is  the  partner,  where  the  partner  is  and  the  objec-
tive  of  the  alliance  may  help  to  advance  the  literature.
•  Study  how  contracts  shape  the  behaviour  of  partners,  and
thus  the  performance  of  these  alliances.  As  argued  by
Contractor  and  Reuer  (2014)  or  Weber  and  Mayer  (2011),
contract  design  can  indeed  have  an  important  inﬂuence
on  the  behaviour  of  the  alliance  partners,  however  there
is  still  an  important  gap  in  the  literature  on  their  effect
on  R&D  alliances.
•  Explore  more  effective  ways  to  acquire,  transfer,  trans-
late,  transform  and  integrate  external  technological
knowledge  for  multiple  and  diverse  partner,  especially  in
international  alliances.  More  studies  are  needed  to  bet-
ter  understand  how  ﬁrms  can  effectively  ‘‘orquestrate’’
their  dispersed  R&D  activities,  for  example  linking  the
R&D  alliance  literature  with  that  on  open  innovation  (Van
de  Ven  and  Zahra,  2016).
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Obviously,  addressing  all  these  questions  implies  changes
oth  in  relation  to  the  theories  that  we  need  to  apply,  as
ell  as  in  the  type  of  data  that  we  need  to  gather.  On  the
ne  hand,  the  future  of  this  research  ﬁeld  requires  inte-
rating  insights  from  different  disciplines,  especially  from
sychological  or  behavioural  theories  to  more  traditional
anagerial  perspectives  to  analyse  how  more  microfounda-
ional  aspects  inﬂuence  R&D  alliance  decisions.  In  addition,
romising  opportunities  arise  from  studies  analysing  the
nterplay  between  R&D  alliance  management  and  the  IB  lit-
rature.  On  the  other  hand,  the  shift  towards  the  analysis  of
he  details  dealing  with  the  structuring,  governing  and  func-
ioning  of  R&D  alliances  means  that  empirical  studies  need
o  gather  more  ‘‘micro’’  data  at  the  transaction  or  dyad
evel,  and/or  longitudinal  data  to  allow  for  the  understand-
ng  of  how  partnerships  evolve  over  time.  Studies  on  R&D
lliances  tend  to  use  large  alliance  databases.  Each  database
as  its  unique  advantages  and  disadvantages----see  Schilling
2009)  for  an  extensive  review----each  of  which  introduces  its
wn  biases  to  the  analyses.  For  instance,  research  on  R&D
lliances  has  traditionally  focused  on  very  broad  governance
hoices  because  of  the  limitations  due  to  the  way  in  which
hese  databases  were  originally  designed.  However,  scholars
re  nowadays  encouraged  to  complement  these  data  con-
aining  public  announcements  with  additional  data  sources
temming  from  primary  sources  such  as  surveys,  and/or  use
econdary  data  offering  richer  information  on  the  details  of
he  agreements.  Indeed,  accessing  primary  data  is  the  only
ay  to  analyse  how  managerial  perceptions  may  inﬂuence
heir  alliance  decisions.  It  is  obvious  that  collecting  these
ata  is  very  difﬁcult  and  thus  becomes  a  huge  challenge  for
esearchers.
Finally,  it  should  be  acknowledged  that  given  the  highly
ynamic  nature  of  the  technological  landscape,  and  because
ifferent  contexts  may  offer  different  challenges  or  oppor-
unities  for  value  creation  or  appropriation,  ﬁrms  need
o  constantly  update  and  adapt  their  alliance  capabilities
Wang  and  Rajagopalan,  2014).  Further  studies  can  deepen
n  the  understanding  of  how  to  develop  these  dynamic
lliance  capabilities  for  R&D  partnerships  so  as  to  max-
mise  value  creation  and  appropriation  over  time.  In  effect,
ffectively  managing  this  trade-off  has  been  found  to  be
specially  relevant  and  at  the  same  time  challenging  within
&D  alliances.
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